Europe is divided on how to construct and exploit pipelines importing Russian gas to the EU. The division evinces two opposing models, which I label (1) the Overcapacity and Exemption-Based Model and (2) the Optimal Capacity and Regulatory-Based Model. As those labels suggest, these models are premised on different assumptions as to the number and capacity of such pipelines that the EU requires, and as to how far those pipelines should be subject to EU energy law. The struggle between these models is not merely a legal one. More fundamentally, it is an economic and geopolitical one involving a wide range of stakeholders: provisions of EU energy law. In particular, it is consistent with that law's aim of diversifying the external suppliers, sources and routes of gas supplies available to the EU. This article concludes that this latter model must win in the OPAL and Nord Stream 2 disputes, and, moreover, that it must be implemented with respect to all eastern import pipelines and connected pipelines before any further pro-competitive or pro-integrative reforms to the EU's energy law and policy.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, one of the greatest challenges facing the EU's energy policy has been presented by the existing and planned pipelines importing Russian gas to the EU. This includes in particular the 'eastern import pipelines' (Nord Stream, Nord Stream 2, South Stream and Turkish Stream) and the 'connected pipelines' (the infrastructural and functional extensions of the eastern import pipelines: OPAL, NEL and EUGAL). 1 Member States, EU institutions and other stakeholders are sharply divided over not only the geopolitical and economic importance of these pipelines in ensuring the security of gas supplies to the EU Member States, but also how far they should be subject to EU energy law. On one side are Germany and other
Western European countries; on the other, the Central and Eastern European countries ('the CEE countries'). The present article argues that these legal disputes concerning Nord Stream 2 and OPAL starkly demonstrate the nature of the division noted above. They embody the struggle between two opposing models of building and using both the eastern 1 A detailed map of all of the already existing and planned gas pipelines in Europe can be found at: https://www.entsog.eu/public/uploads/files/publications/Maps/2017/ENTSOG_CAP_2017_A0_1189x841 _FULL_064.pdf. 2 See, e.g., Rafael Leal-Arcas, Costantino Grasso, and Juan Alemany Rios, Sections V and VI analyse these two models, building on the conclusions drawn from the analysis of the Nord Stream 2 and OPAL legal disputes in sections II and III. Section V contends that continued implementation of the first model (Overcapacity and Exemption-Based) in the eastern import pipelines and the connected pipelines would lead to a number of undesirable consequences in the EU, notably: a deepening of axiological inconsistencies in EU energy policy; an undermining of the gains made by EU energy law; and the weakening of energy solidarity. By contrast, Section VI shows that the second model (Optimal Capacity and Regulatory-Based) is fully aligned with the objectives and provisions of EU energy law. In particular, it furthers that law's aim of diversifying the external suppliers, sources and routes of gas supplies available to the EU, which is, in turn, a key pillar of the EU's energy security strategy. This article concludes that this second model must win in the OPAL and Nord Stream 2 disputes, and that it must be implemented with respect to the eastern import pipelines and the connected pipelines before any further pro-competitive and pro-integrative reforms to the EU's energy law and policy.
Before considering these broader points, we must begin by looking more closely at the Nord Stream 2 and OPAL legal disputes and the way they illustrate the tensions between the two models.
THE LEGAL DISPUTE OVER THE APPLICABILITY OF THE TEP TO NORD STREAM 2 AND SIMILAR IMPORT PIPELINES
A fierce legal dispute is currently underway in the EU as to whether Nord Stream 2, when built, will be subject to the TEP; this legal dispute should be distinguished from the broader controversy over the economic and geopolitical justification for Nord Stream 2 being built in the first place (see Section IV).
Those who oppose the TEP's application to Nord Stream 2 claim that their position is supported by the provisions of the TEP, the intention of the EU legislature and the current administrative practices at EU and Member States level. 4 ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 11, NUMBER 2 2018
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In particular, since regulatory exemption in Article 36 of Directive 2009/73/EC cannot apply to import pipelines like Nord Stream 2, that is, pipelines that import natural gas from a third country to the EU, those pipelines would be subject to the Directive's obligations without the counterbalance of the regulatory exemption from which intra-EU pipelines benefit. Because such discrimination between intra-EU and import pipelines would, they say, be arbitrary and impossible to justify, it follows that the EU legislature simply cannot have intended for Directive 2009/73/EC to apply to import pipelines, including offshore pipelines. 5 This is underlined by practice: the TEP is currently de facto not applied to existing offshore import pipelines (e.g. Nord Stream, Green Stream, 6 Medgaz 7 ) by the European Commission ('EC') or by the EU Member States through whose land or maritime territories those pipelines run. 8 According to this position, Nord Stream 2 simply falls outside of the TEP. It is therefore immune from all of the TEP's pro-competitive regulatory arrangements, including the rules on unbundling (i.e. the requirement to separate transmission activities from other activities in the gas sector 9 ), on the designation and certification of transmission system operators, 10 on the access of third parties to the transmission networks 11 , and on the fixing and approval of tariffs. 12 This article contends that the above position is not merely surprising, it is wrong. As it stands, the TEP applies in full to Nord Stream 2 and to similar import pipelines, including the existing Nord Stream. This follows from three points.
First, the TEP treats and regulates all gas transmission pipelines within the EU equally. It is irrelevant whether they are solely, or only partly, located on EU territory. The provisions of the TEP show that the EU legislator was fully aware of the fact that in the EU there are currently, and may be in the future, import pipelines partly situated outside of EU territory. 13 Despite that manifest awareness, effective functioning of the internal gas market, or the security of gas supply to the EU. 21 We will return to this amendment below, in section VI.
THE LEGAL DISPUTE OVER THE REGULATORY EXEMPTION GRANTED TO OPAL
This dispute concerns the extent of the regulatory exemption granted to the OPAL pipeline. As will be shown below, the current exemption (granted in 2016)
contradicts previous regulatory practice and undermines the EU's interests and policy.
The OPAL pipeline transports Russian gas through the territory of Germany to its border with the Czech Republic. Russian gas flows through the Nord Stream pipeline to Greifswald, in northern Germany, OPAL's entry point. It then flows through OPAL until that pipeline's exit point in Brandov, on the German-Czech border. From Brandov, the gas is transmitted within the Czech Republic by the Gazelle pipeline, which is, in turn, connected to both the Czech transmission system and the MEGAL pipeline. The latter further transports the Russian gas through southern Germany to France. The OPAL pipeline is co-owned by two companies, one of which is (indirectly) controlled by Gazprom. The pipeline's operator is also a company which is dependent on Gazprom. The 2016 EC OPAL Decision concludes that the 2016 OPAL Exemption will neither negatively affect competition in the Czech and German wholesale gas supply markets, nor be detrimental to the internal gas market. Instead, it will increase the security of gas supply to the EU. 29 This will be especially so for the operators of the Yamal-Europe pipeline (which runs from Russia, through Poland, to Germany) and the Brotherhood pipeline (which runs from Russia, through Ukraine, to Slovakia; and then onward via two further streams, one to Hungary and Austria, and the other to the Czech Republic and Germany Brotherhood pipelines, and therefore decreasing revenues of their operators from transmission fees. 32 The 2016 OPAL Exemption will also have very negative effects on the market position of gas suppliers in Poland and Slovakia. This will be caused by a significant rise in their operating costs.
The fourth answer is that the 2016 OPAL Exemption will erode the market position of gas suppliers importing gas from Western Europe to Poland and Slovakia. As the volume of Russian gas transported westward through the YamalEurope and Brotherhood pipelines decreases, Poland and Slovakia will need more gas via other routes to compensate. This will trigger the need for an increased use of the physical reverse flow capacities of the Yamal-Europe and Brotherhood pipelines, so as to supply larger volumes of gas from Germany to Poland (via Yamal-Europe) and from the Czech Republic and Austria to Slovakia (via Brotherhood). The result will be a huge increase of transmission tariffs rates for physical transportation of gas to Poland and Slovakia from the west, 33 as well as a decrease of physical reverse flow capacities available at the western entry points to the Yamal-Europe and the Slovak section of the Brotherhood pipelines. Both of these occurrences will greatly increase the operating costs of gas suppliers importing gas from the west to Poland and Slovakia using the physical reverse flow capacities, in turn gradually but inevitably eroding their market position.
In the long run, all three of these market developments will greatly benefit Gazprom and Gazprom Export. Their dominant position in gas supply markets in
Poland and Slovakia will be strengthened, 34 as will their ability to abuse this market power. 32 That this scenario is a realistic one can be demonstrated by the fact that exactly such changes in the proportion of use of particular pipelines occurred in late December 2016 and early January 2017, i.e. when the operator of OPAL and Gazprom Export started to effectively implement the 2016 OPAL Exemption (eliminating the regulatory cap with regard to OPAL) and before those undertakings complied with the order of the General Court (issued on 23 December 2016) temporarily suspending the 2016 EC OPAL Decision. During this period, the volume of Russian gas transported via the Nord Stream-OPAL route increased (from about 600,000 MWh/d to nearly 1,100,000 MWh/d, measured in Greifswald). Relevant gas flows through the Brotherhood pipeline decreased (from about 1,700,000 WMh/d to 1,200,000 MWh/d, measured in Veľké Kapušany in Slovakia). This suggests that, if there is no regulatory cap with regard to OPAL, Gazprom and Gazprom Export will prefer to export their gas through Nord Stream and OPAL rather than through the Brotherhood pipeline: see Katja Yafimava, supra note 26: 25-26. 33 Such an increase of transmission tariff rates for reverse flow capacities in fact occurred during the period October 2014 to March 2015, when Gazprom decided to decrease its gas supplies to Poland. During this period, the Polish wholesale gas suppliers were forced to buy additional volumes of gas from Germany, using the physical reverse flow capacities of Yamal-Europe pipeline. As a result, the tariff rates for physical reverse flow capacities at the entry point in Mallnow increased: in November 2014 they increased over 230% as compared to the standard tariff rates, in December 2014 the increase stood at over 240%, and in the first quarter of 2015 those tariff rates remained at about 80% over standard rates -see the data available at: https://transparency.entsog.eu/#/points/data?points=DE-TSO-0001ITP-00096exit%2CPL-TSO-0001ITP-00096entry and at: https://aukcje.gazsystem.pl/auctions?tab=A. 34 As the EC admits, Gazprom is still a dominant player on the Polish and Slovak upstream wholesale gas markets, as well as on upstream wholesale gas markets in other CEE countries -see the data available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_39816.
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In addition to its negative effects on competition, the 2016 OPAL Exemption will also diminish the security of gas supplies to the EU -in particular to Poland and Slovakia. True, the 2016 OPAL Exemption will result in an increased flow of Russian gas via OPAL, and thus in a greater supply of gas to the Czech Republic and to Western Europe. However, these increased supplies are in fact neither needed to cover any rising demand for gas in the EU (to the contrary: since 2010, gas consumption in the EU has fallen about 15%), 35 nor likely to stimulate demand in previously untapped markets or consumers in the EU. Furthermore, increased gas supply via OPAL will not give the EU access to the new sources of gas from new suppliers. On the contrary, this gas comes from traditional suppliers to the EU (Gazprom and its affiliate Gazprom Export), and originates in long-exploited gas deposits in Russia. The increased supplies of Russian gas through OPAL caused by the 2016 OPAL Exemption do not constitute an overall increase in the EU's gas supply, as is evident from the constantly decreasing flows of Russian gas through This gradual replacement of the Yamal-Europe and Brotherhood pipelines, until now the main transit routes for Russian gas to Western Europe, will significantly threaten the security of gas supplies to Poland and Slovakia (as well to other CEE countries).
To summarise, then, the 2016 OPAL Exemption contradicts the EC's previous regulatory exemption practice, and underestimates its serious threats to 35 ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 11, NUMBER 2 2018 107 competition, gas supply security and the internal gas market, especially in neighbouring countries.
THE LEGAL DISPUTES CONCERNING NORD STREAM 2 AND OPAL AS A CLASH OF MODELS
Having described and analysed the legal disputes concerning TEP's application supplies of Russian gas to the EU. 38 In turn, for Russia this model is advantageous for both economic and geopolitical reasons. In particular, it gives Russia the ability to prefer particular transit routes for Russian gas (i.e. particular eastern import pipelines) over others for geopolitical purposes, and it strengthens Russia's bargaining power in gas negotiations and disputes with Ukraine, the other CEE countries and China. 39 The second model is the 'Optimal Capacity and Regulatory-Based Model'. This is primarily advanced by the CEE countries, and posits the following: first, that the existing eastern import pipelines (Nord Stream, Yamal-Europe and Brotherhood)
are, in combination with other external and internal sources of gas to the EU, fully capable of guaranteeing the EU's gas supply security. This is so in terms of not only the volume of gas they supply, but also the number of pipelines and diversity of routes supplying Russian gas to the EU. Secondly and as a corollary, no new eastern import pipelines need be built: these would simply add to the already adequate number and capacity of existing routes, rendering some of them superfluous. Thirdly, all eastern import pipelines and connected pipelines should be fully subject to the provisions of the TEP. This is because only the full application of these regulatory arrangements (including unbundling, third party access and price regulation) to those pipelines is capable of ensuring sufficient competition (including price competition) in the EU energy markets, the security of the EU's gas supply, the proper functioning of the internal gas market, and greater choice and lower gas prices for EU consumers. Russia, already the dominant external source of the EU's gas; and to reduce the risk of discrimination by Russian gas suppliers against certain EEC countries. 40 Before considering the substance of this dispute, we should pause to consider the relationship between economic and geopolitical arguments on the one hand, and legal arguments on the other. The critical point here is that the former dominate. Both models express specific economic and geopolitical approaches, and are often justified in those terms. Where legal arguments are invoked by the proponents of either side, they play a primarily instrumental role: they are invoked and used as tools to promote a given model and demonstrate its supremacy over another, especially in a given legal dispute or proceedings.
Ideally it would be possible to separate these two sorts of arguments with regard to the eastern import and connected pipelines. It should be possible to consider economic and geopolitical arguments in isolation -i.e. whether each model, including the legal regime that applies under it, furthers certain strategic interests of the EU, such as the security of the EU's gas supply, the EU's security in general, competition, the internal gas market and diversification of gas supply. It should be similarly possible to consider legal arguments independently -e.g. In practice, however, these two categories of arguments cannot so easily be disentangled; in fact, they are often inseparable. This is particularly so with respect to the dispute over the 2016 OPAL Exemption. The provisions of Article 36(1) of Directive 2009/73/EC, the legal basis for that exemption, contains conditions precisely anchored in economic and geopolitical factors (e.g. the security of gas supply and competition in gas markets). Three things follow. First, it is not possible to distinguish economic and geopolitical arguments from purely legal ones. Second, it is unsurprising that the 2016 OPAL Exemption is economically and geopolitically instrumentalised. Third, the legal dispute concerning that regulatory exemption is a battleground between these two economic and geopolitical models, and thus a particularly useful way to understand how they clash. 40 See, e.g., Alan Riley, "Nord incorrectly considered and applied that provision's conditions concerning competition, security of gas supply and the effective functioning of the internal gas market.
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Having clarified the relationship between economic/geopolitical and legal arguments here, we turn now to evaluate the two rival models for building and using the eastern import and connected pipelines. The next Sections of the present article will consider the economic and geopolitical arguments underlying both models. At the same time, we will evaluate these arguments in light of specific provisions and objectives of the TEP, and also in the light of the gas supply energy policy implicit in those provisions and objectives. 42 Exemption. This will strengthen the market power of Russian undertakings and weaken competition in the EU gas market. First, it will enhance the market power of those Russian undertakings, especially in those upstream wholesale gas supply markets where Gazprom and Gazprom Export are already dominant (namely those of the CEE countries and Germany).
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Second, it will give those undertakings more options (routes) to transport their gas so as to foreclose certain undertakings or regions within the EU, take advantage of price arbitrage on rates for gas transmission via various pipelines, and/or influence the price of gas across the European gas market.
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Third, the ability of Gazprom and Gazprom Export arbitrarily to favour certain transmission routes (e.g. Nord Stream-OPAL or Nord Stream 2-EUGAL) at the expense of others (e.g. Yamal-Europe or Brotherhood) by directing the majority of their gas down the former, will enable them to harm the competitive position of the operators and users of the latter. As noted above, the operators depend on the revenues that this gas transmission brings 49 in order to invest in transmission infrastructure. This will in turn entail higher tariff rates for both transmission and 47 Not only do Gazprom and Gazprom Export have dominant positions on these markets; they also abuse that position, as the EC rightly alleges. According to the EC, Gazprom abuses its dominant position by, inter alia: imposing territorial restrictions in its supply agreements with wholesalers; pursuing an unfair pricing policy in the CEE countries, charging prices to wholesalers that are significantly higher compared to Gazprom's costs or to benchmark prices; and making gas supplies to some EEC countries conditional on obtaining unrelated commitments from wholesalers concerning gas transport infrastructure. reverse flow, thereby increasing the operating costs and worsening the competitive position of wholesale gas suppliers that currently buy gas transported through the marginalised pipelines. The end result will be harm to consumers, who will be subjected to higher prices and a less competitive environment.
Fourth, the decision to immunise the eastern import and connected pipelines from the pro-competitive obligations of the TEP will undermine competition.
Exemption from the TEP -including its provisions on unbundling, third party access and price regulation -permit those pipelines' operators to favour Russian or
European undertakings which supply gas and are affiliated with them, at the expense of their (very often more efficient) market rivals. Again, this harms the interests of gas consumers.
We now turn to gas security. Implementation of the first model (Overcapacity and Exemption-Based), including by the construction of Nord Stream 2 and the 2016 OPAL Exemption, will severely undermine the EU's gas supply security. First, it will reduce the gas supply to the CEE countries. As noted above, it will reduce supply via the existing pipelines from the east (Yamal-Europe, Brotherhood), and there are serious obstacles to the consequent shortfall being filled by physical reverse flows, via those existing pipelines, from the west. These obstacles include:
(1) scarcity of reverse flow capacity (congestion, cross-border bottlenecks) and an increase in tariff rates for such reverse gas transmission; 50 (2) a shortage of 56 As shown above, this will come at the expense of other pipelines running through the CEE countries and appreciably diminish the security of gas supply to those latter countries.
A final point must be made with respect to gas security, and this concerns solidarity. Even if it is predicated that the 2016 OPAL Exemption and the construction of Nord Stream 2 will bring a slight increase in Germany's and/or other Western European countries' gas supply security, this should not occur at the expense of a drastic reduction in the gas supply security of the CEE countries. Such an outcome would be clearly contrary to the principle of solidarity. The removal of the capacity cap applied to Gazprom and Gazprom Export's use of OPAL -which was the result of the 2016 OPAL Exemption -and the changes in the ratio of utilisation of particular routes for transporting Russian gas to the EU which followed, indicate that Gazprom and Gazprom Export prefer to export their gas via Nord Stream and OPAL rather than through Ukraine and Slovakia. This also suggests that these undertakings will prefer Nord Stream 2 and its onshore extension (when built) over the Ukrainian-Slovak route - is, moreover, detrimental to the functioning of the internal gas market. 'Internal gas market' should be understood as an area without barriers or obstacles to the free cross-border flow of natural gas. 58 In addition, it is a physically interconnected area where there are many different routes for the transmission of gas and differentiated gas sources. This area should be uniformly subject to the provisions of EU energy law and enjoy a uniformly high degree of security of gas supply. 59 Yet implementation of the first model -including the 2016 OPAL Exemption and the proposed construction of Nord Stream 2 -will adversely affect this. It will result in the partitioning of the EU gas market into two distinct areas: a well-supplied
Western and Northern Europe, benefitting from a liquid market, and a much worsesupplied CEE area which is more dependent on external gas supplies.
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It follows, moreover, that the failure to apply the provisions of the TEP to the eastern import pipelines (like Nord Stream and Nord Stream 2) and the connected pipelines (like OPAL and, in the future, EUGAL) undermines the proper functioning of the internal gas market. This is because, in practice, it prevents third parties from making use of these pipelines, thereby creating barriers to the free flow of gas between EU Member States.
Having considered the economic and geopolitical side of this model, we turn to consider the law. From the provisions of the TEP -both those declaring general objectives and those relating to specific regulatory instruments, including the regulatory exemption under Article 36 of Directive 2009/73/EC -it is clear that EU energy law seeks to achieve the following objectives: increased competition in the transmission and supply gas markets; optimal security of gas supply, in a spirit of solidarity between the EU Member States; and the effective functioning of the internal gas market. 61 Implementation of the Overcapacity and Exemption-Based
Model with respect to the eastern import and connected pipelines would undermine all three objectives placing that model in direct contradiction with the provisions and objectives of the TEP. It would further contradict the EU's stated policy of seeking to diversify its gas supply: this means the diversification of suppliers (i.e. from different regions of the world), sources of gas (including LNG) and infrastructures transporting gas. 62 In striking contrast to this policy, the first model makes the EU strongly dependent on one external dominant gas supplier, hinders the flexible diversification of sources of gas (for instance, by making actions that aim to increase LNG supplies to the EU less attractive) 63 and risks starving so as to make superfluous the existing CEE import pipelines (by enabling Russia to concentrate the import of its gas to the EU in one or two pipeline routes, such as Nord Stream-OPAL, and in the future Nord Stream 2-EUGAL). In turn, this concentration (as opposed to diversification) is clearly harmful to both competition in gas markets and the security of gas supply, again contradicting EU energy law's provisions and objectives.
This is all the more striking given the broader legislative context. Currently, the EU institutions are considering moving to an even more advanced stage of gas market regulation and integration, strengthening EU energy law's pro-competitive and pro-integrative instruments. 64 Significantly, many market participantsincluding energy companies -are demanding a far-reaching strengthening of those instruments in the gas sector (e.g. more extensive unbundling). 65 By contrast, implementation of the Overcapacity and Exemption-Based Model with respect to the eastern import and connected pipelines leads to entirely different effects -not least because it requires the EU and Member States to renounce existing EU regulatory law in the gas sector, precisely in the parts of the sector which are most important for ensuring the EU's gas supply. Further implementation of this model will mean that a significant part of the EU gas transmission infrastructure, transporting the great majority of the volume of gas that is currently transported through all EU pipelines, will simply fall outside of EU energy law. At this stage of the development of the EU internal gas market and its regulation, this regulatory gap cannot be accepted. When -as is only a matter of time -that market becomes still more 63 See note 54. It is also argued that transport infrastructure emerging in the CEE countries as part of the north-south corridor would not be used to import and transport gas from alternative sources, but instead primarily from Russia: Kai-Olaf Lang and Kirsten Westphal, supra note 2: 29. 64 To that end the EC invited stakeholders to carry out and comment on studies on a gas market design for the EU, entitled: "Quo vadis EU gas market regulatory framework". See the notice available at: https://etendering.ted.europa.eu/cft/cft-display.html?cftId=1818. 65 See the discussions papers and stakeholder responses received by the EC and collected as "Study on Quo vadis gas market regulatory framework" (11/2016) // https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/studies/study-quo-vadis-gas-market-regulatory-framework.
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However, there is a chance that this negative scenario will not materialize in full, even if the Overcapacity and Exemption-Based Model is implemented. Under the latter model, there are two indispensible conditions of reversing the aforementioned threats for competition, security of gas supply and internal gas market: the consequent construction of new LNG terminals in EU (also in Baltic
Member States) and consistent enforcement of EU competition law with regard to
Gazprom and its affiliates -thus far this was rather problematic.
THE OPTIMAL CAPACITY AND REGULATORY-BASED MODEL AS THE

METHOD OF ENSURING CONSISTENCY IN THE EU ENERGY LAW AND POLICY
In the final substantive section of this article, we turn to consider the second model (Optimal Capacity and Regulatory-Based) as applied to the eastern import and connected pipelines. The present article argues that in contrast to the first model, this model is fully consistent with the provisions and objectives of the TEP.
Moreover, it promotes the diversification of the suppliers, sources and routes of gas supplies to the EU -one of the primary aims of EU energy policy.
Let us begin by defining 'Optimal Capacity' more precisely. This requires that the number and capacity of the eastern import and connected pipelines be tailored, not excessive. That is, their number and capacity should be approximately adapted to the demand for Russian gas in the EU, both that currently existing and that realistically predicted for the future. 66 This should take into account the need to also derive gas from other sources, including from the EU's own internal deposits; 67 66 In 2017, the EU imported 179 bcm of Russian gas, which amounted to 34% of the EU's total gas supply (526 bcm). This was an all-time high and amounted to a further consolidation of Russia's position as the main gas supplier to the EU: "Annual Report on the Results of Monitoring the Internal Electricity and Gas Markets in 2017: Gas Wholesale Markets Volume," ACER/CEER (September 2018): 14 (hereinafter -'the 2017 ACER Report') // https://www.acer.europa.eu/Official_documents/Acts_of_the_Agency/Publication/ACER%20Market%20M onitoring%20Report%202017%20-%20Gas%20Wholesale%20Markets%20Volume.pdf. The future demand for Russian gas in the EU will depend on the EU's overall demand for gas and on the EU's policy towards diversification of gas supply. According to various forecasts, based on uncertain economic and political scenarios, in 2025 the Russian gas supplies to the EU will amount to between 120 to 151 bcm (26-31% of the then total gas supply to the EU), and in 2030 they will amount to between 112 to 145 bcm (24-30% of the then total gas supply to the EU): Harald Hecking, Simon Schulte, Adnan Vatansever, and Slawomir Raszewski, supra note 38: 73-85. The security of gas supply in the EU requires that Russian supplies should not significantly exceed 30% of total gas supplies. 67 In 2017, EU gas production amounted to about 128 bcm, which was 24% of the EU's total gas supply: "Quarterly Report on European Gas Markets", DG Energy Volume 10, Issue 4 (Fourth Quarter of 2017): 9 (hereinafter -'the 2017-4 Quarterly Report') // https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/quarterly_report_on_european_gas_markets_q 4_2017_final_20180323.pdf. It is expected that the share of the EU's domestic production could drop to below 20% by 2030, unless there is progress in exploring shale gas and biogas resources. Having clarified what the first part of this model consists of, we can consider its consequences. First, this model creates the optimal conditions for diversifying the EU's gas supply in terms of suppliers, sources and routes. Such diversification is highly beneficial to competition within EU gas markets. It does not reinforce the market position of one external supplier of gas alone, or of only those very few gas undertakings which enjoy close relations with that supplier, Gazprom. Instead, it sustains the balance, and adequate dispersion of market power, of gas undertakings active in various geographical markets in the EU -including by maintaining the competitive position of gas undertakings in the CEE countries.
Second, this diversification is in turn advantageous for the EU's gas supply security, ensuring that the EU is supplied with gas from various alternative suppliers and sources and that Russian gas flows evenly throughout the CEE countries. This disables Russian gas suppliers from concentrating the vast majority of their gas supplies on arbitrarily-selected transmission routes and removes their incentive to favour or discriminate against certain of the same. Moreover, it contributes to the realization of energy solidarity in the EU and ensures that charges for the transmission of Russian gas are fairly distributed between all of the transit countries concerned.
Turning to the second part of this model -regulation -equally positive results are achieved by subjecting the eastern import and connected pipelines to relevant EU law. First, this means that all of these pipelines are managed by independent operators with no incentive to favour any one gas supplier. They can concentrate their efforts on developing the transmission system not in the interest of one dominant gas supplier (here, Gazprom), but rather in the interest of the security of gas supply throughout the EU, especially by building interconnection points and 68 The second main external gas supplier to the EU is Norway (about 122.4 bcm in 2017, which amounted to 23% of the EU's total gas supply -the 2017-4 Quarterly Report, 2 and 11). The others external gas suppliers are: Algeria (via pipeline and LNG), Libya (via pipeline), Qatar (LNG) and Nigeria (LNG): the 2017 ACER Report, 14. In order to further diversify the suppliers and sources of gas to the EU, it is planned to construct the East Med pipeline to transport natural gas from Israel and Cyprus to Europe; this would provide access to the Israeli offshore gas fields. There are also plans to import gas to the EU from the Caucasus via Turkey through the Southern Gas Corridor. 69 As regards some recently completed and proposed LNG terminals, see "Quarterly Report on European Gas Markets", DG Energy, Volume the smaller the exempted capacity of the connected pipelines, the lower the economic incentives for Russia and Gazprom to increase the number, capacity or actual use of the existing and proposed eastern import pipelines at the expense of other pipelines running through the CEE countries.
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As for the second limb, the eastern import and connected pipelines should be subjected to the appropriate level of regulation in the following way. First, the EC 71 This is not to say that these requirements should be established with the aim of deliberately obstructing a given pipeline. Nonetheless, they should effectively protect the environment from any undesired impact by a pipeline, especially in such an ecologically sensitive area as the Baltic Sea. 72 Even if this regulatory strategy does not prevent construction of any given eastern pipeline, it may nevertheless reduce the capacity of that pipeline that is exclusively available to Gazprom and Gazprom Export. As previously argued, such exclusive access disadvantages both competition in the internal market and EU gas supply security. 73 The actions proposed in this paragraph aim to avoid an excessive number and/or capacity of eastern import pipelines by market principles alone. In particular, they do not include any legislative or administrative bans, or oblige any undertaking to withdraw from a given project. Instead, they are confined to the elimination of any public regulatory or financial support for these pipelines. These propositions are therefore in harmony with the principle that decisions to build or refrain from building new pipelines in the EU should be left to private market actors driven by market considerations only (e.g. existing and predicted gas demand and the prospects of profit There is no doubt that Russian gas is and will remain one of the most important sources of the EU's energy security. The aim of this model is not to undermine this; rather, it is to diversify the EU's gas supply and to subject the pipelines transporting Russian gas to the ordinary rules of EU energy law. only in the fact of these disputes, but also the economic and geopolitical arguments put forward by the parties involved in these disputes.
CONCLUSIONS
It is argued that the first model (Overcapacity and Exemption-Based), promoted by certain economic and political groups, is in conflict with the provisions and objectives of the EU energy law. It is also inconsistent with the EU's energy policy on gas supplies, which aims to diversify external gas suppliers, sources of gas and gas transport routes. It jeopardizes competition on the EU gas markets, diminishes the security of gas supply to the CEE countries and creates unnecessary barriers to gas flows between Member States. Even for the Western European countries it gives only an illusory feeling of increased gas supply security: it is clear that the first model will weaken gas supply to the CEE countries, negatively impacting not only their economies but also those of Western Europe, given the strong interdependence between the two lungs of Europe. Finally, this Overcapacity and Exemption-Based Model is anachronistic and regressive in light of the current state of integration of the internal gas market and the contemporary regulatory achievements of the EU, particularly in light of emerging proposals to make the EU's energy market still more competitive and integrated.
Therefore, it is contended that all EU institutions and Member States should now be far-sighted. In their own enlightened self-interest, they should ensure that the eastern import and connected pipelines are subject to EU energy law in its entirety, without unwarranted derogations or exemptions. The EU institutions and Member States should also strive to ensure the number and capacity of those pipelines are not excessive, but rather approximately adapted to the current and forecasted demand for Russian gas in the EU, taking into account the need to diversify gas supply to the EU (by stimulating internal production, increasing external supply from non-Russian suppliers and sources, and buildings LNG terminals). They should incentivise Russian suppliers to differentiation, rather than concentration, of gas transmission routes to the EU.
EU energy law and policy must be characterised by elementary coherence and rationality. To that end, the future fate of the eastern import and connected pipelines should be rooted in the Optimal Capacity and Regulatory-Based Model. 
